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Settlement Sovereignty: 
The Meskwaki Fight 
for Self-Governance, 1856–1937 
ERIC STEVEN ZIMMER 
ON NOVEMBER 17, 1937, an official at the Office of Indian Af-
fairs (OIA) in Washington, D.C., wired a brief, fragmented note 
to the superintendent at the Tama Indian Agency in central Iowa: 
“Congratulations to you and Indians results Iowa constitution 
election.”1 The message’s hurried, celebratory tone came in re-
sponse to news the OIA had received a day earlier: members of 
the Meskwaki tribe had accepted, by an excruciatingly narrow 
two-vote margin, a constitution in accordance with the provisions 
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). Less than a month 
later, a message from several Meskwaki men about the same 
event arrived on the desk of the U.S. Secretary of the Interior. 
This petition took a far different tone: “We members of the Sac 
and Fox Indians at Tama Iowa are not satisfied with the election 
This article would not have been possible without funding from the University 
of Iowa (UI) Graduate Student Senate and a State Historical Society of Iowa Re-
search Grant. The author presented drafts at UI history department conferences 
in 2012 and 2013 and at the Native American and Indigenous Studies Associa-
tion annual meeting in 2013. Many thanks go out to all of the readers, known 
and anonymous, who offered comments—especially Jacki Thompson Rand, 
Johnathan and Suzanne Buffalo, Douglas Foley, and Mary Bennett. The article 
is dedicated, with love, to Samantha, who married me just as it came off the press. 
1. William Zimmerman Jr. to Ira D. Nelson, 11/17/1937, IRA folder, Meskwaki 
Historic Preservation Department and Museum, Tama, Iowa (hereafter IRA-
MHPDM). For further information, see Judith Daubenmier, The Meskwaki and 
Anthropologists: Action Anthropology Reconsidered (Lincoln, NE, 2008), 45; and 
Theodore H. Haas, Ten Years of Tribal Government under I.R.A. (Lawrence, KS, 
1947), 16–26. The Office of Indian Affairs became the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
in 1947. This article uses the historically accurate former term throughout.  
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that was recently supposed to be held, which was supposed to 
adopt a mode of handling the Indian lands that belong to us.” It 
came affixed with nearly a hundred Meskwaki signatures.2  
 These pieces of correspondence reveal the controversy sur-
rounding a tribal legal transformation that had been brewing on 
the settlement for over three years. Since early 1934 Meskwaki 
tribal members had been considering the ramifications of the 
IRA, the most significant legislative change in Indian policy dur-
ing the so-called Indian New Deal. That dramatic shift in federal 
policy presented tribes nationwide with a choice between retain-
ing long-held forms of government and organizing under a con-
stitution that purported to reaffirm tribal self-governance after 
several oppressive and assimilative decades. Despite a conten-
tious debate over the IRA and the language its constitution 
would ultimately take, the tribe officially reorganized in the au-
tumn of 1937.3  
 The ratification that fall marks a pivotal moment in the trans-
formation of Meskwaki governance. The document recast the 
tribal government, and the Meskwaki Nation follows it to this day. 
This article surveys the years between 1856 and 1937, offering a 
case study of the ways American Indian communities have acted 
throughout history to affirm their tribal sovereignty. Meskwaki 
political maneuvering during this period—which included the 
leveraging of their unique land ownership—exposes weaknesses 
in the oppressive project of assimilation carried out by the OIA in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite its best ef-
forts, the agency failed to snuff out the Meskwaki ability to engage 
their politics and control local affairs. Instead, tribal members 
2. John Tataposh et al. to Harold L. Ickes, 12/13/1937, IRA-MHPDM. The Mes-
kwaki Nation is formally recognized as the “Sac and Fox of the Mississippi in 
Iowa.” Meskwaki roughly translates to “Red Earth People” and represents the 
tribal spelling. It is one of three tribes bearing the name “Sac and Fox,” a title 
that derives from the close historical association between the Meskwaki and the 
Sauk. The two others are the Sac and Fox Nation in Oklahoma and the Sac and 
Fox Nation of Missouri in Kansas and Nebraska. See L. Edward Purcell: “The 
Unknown Past: Sources for History Education and the Indians of Iowa,” in The 
Worlds Between Two Rivers: Perspectives on American Indians in Iowa, ed. Gretchen 
M. Bataille, David M. Gradwohl, and Charles L. P. Silet (Ames, 1978), 27.  
3. Johnathan L. Buffalo, “Historical Overview of the Adoption of the Indian Re-
organization Act of 1934 by the Sac and Fox of the Mississippi in Iowa,” 30–33, 
IRA-MHPDM. 
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persistently dodged attacks on their sovereignty and negotiated 
internally to maintain, and ultimately reshape, their government.  
 Historians of Native America have been pushing back against 
monolithic and declensionist narratives of Indian history for 
several decades. Yet many Americans remain familiar with well-
worn stories that frame the removal and relegation of Native 
peoples to federally assigned lands as an easy, straightforward 
process disrupted only when famous leaders like Crazy Horse and 
Geronimo led violent resistance movements. As bloody, destruc-
tive, and oppressive as the Native encounter with the expanding 
American nation often was, tribal peoples were not just militant 
warriors or passive players in a generally swift and easy conquest. 
As Frederick E. Hoxie observes, “Native people spent far more 
time negotiating, lobbying, and debating than they spent toma-
hawking settlers or shooting soldiers.”4 
 The Meskwaki story is one among many that reveal how tribal 
efforts to work against the pressures of colonialism and assert the 
tribe’s sovereignty extend deep into the past and took myriad 
forms.5 C. Joseph Genetin-Pilawa has shown how, in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, the development of federal 
Indian policies like allotment—though long considered neat and 
almost automatic—were in reality hard-fought and highly contin-
gent.6 The Meskwaki story similarly diverges from standard nar-
ratives of Native history. It exposes weaknesses in the fortress of 
American colonialism by showing how a small tribe that owned its 
4. Frederick E. Hoxie, This Indian Country: American Indian Activists and the Place 
They Made (New York, 2012), 4.  
5. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations
(New York, 2005), 188–204; and George Pierre Castile, Taking Charge: Native Amer-
ican Self-Determination and Federal Indian Policy, 1975–1999 (Tucson, AZ, 2006). 
Several authors have recognized Meskwaki persistence as a unifying historical 
theme. See, for example, R. David Edmunds and Joseph L. Peyser, The Fox Wars: 
The Mesquakie Challenge to New France (Norman, OK, 1993), xvii–xviii. For dis-
cussions of sovereignty, self-determination, and self-governance, see Joanne 
Barker, “For Whom Sovereignty Matters,” and Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty,” 
both in Sovereignty Matters: Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous 
Struggles for Self-Determination, ed. Joanne Barker (Lincoln, NE, 2005); and Susan 
A. Miller, “Native Historians Write Back: The Indigenous Paradigm in Ameri-
can Indian Historiography,” Wicaso Sa Review 24 (2009), 32.  
6. See C. Joseph Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked Paths to Allotment: The Fight over Federal 
Indian Policy after the Civil War (Chapel Hill, NC, 2012). 
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land carved a unique path through the policies of assimilation and 
allotment and fought to reform its government on its own terms.  
 This article follows in the footsteps of those scholars who have 
recently uncovered tribal strategies to work within and around 
their precarious relationship to the U.S. government over the 
past two hundred years.7 It emphasizes tribal-federal relations 
but makes a few cursory nods to state-tribal politics—a subject to 
be expanded upon in future research. In the 1850s a contingent 
of tribal members returned to Iowa and joined some Meskwaki 
who never left the state. In 1857 they purchased an 80-acre “set-
tlement,” upon which tribal members subsisted and repelled fed-
eral incursions into their economic, political, and social practices 
until the State of Iowa transferred the land into federal trust in 
1896. Thereafter, the OIA exploited a political rift within the tribe, 
which, over time, the agency used to weaken Meskwaki sover-
eignty and slowly erode tribal control over its governance. Even 
as their political power withered, tribal members continued to 
participate in local, and later national, politics. Meskwaki people 
organized around several key issues, made their voices heard, 
and influenced the outcomes of various disputes with local ad-
ministrators. The Meskwaki encounter with the Indian New Deal 
of the 1930s shows how political developments in preceding dec-
ades shaped tribal responses to the IRA and, ultimately, how the 
tribe recast its government in 1937.8 Although this essay ends 
with the ratification of the constitution, debates over its ramifica-
tions for Meskwaki governance, as well as the tribe’s sovereign 
struggle, continue today. 
THE MESKWAKI NATION holds a unique distinction in the 
history of Native America: it was the first tribe to purchase 
its land after the era of Indian removal in the mid–nineteenth 
7. See, for example, Kevin Bruyneel, The Third Space of Sovereignty: The Post-
colonial Politics of U.S.-Indigenous Relations (Minneapolis, 2007); David R. M. Beck, 
The Struggle for Self-Determination: History of the Menominee Indians since 1854 
(Lincoln, NE, 2005); and Valerie Lambert, Choctaw Nation: A Story of American 
Indian Resurgence (Lincoln, NE, 2007).  
8. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (6/18/1934), 984–88; and Constitution and By-
Laws of the Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in Iowa (Washington, DC, 1938). 
The constitution can be viewed in full at www.meskwaki.org/trcode.html, ac-
cessed 3/24/2013. 
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century.9 In 1857 the Meskwaki sidestepped the assignment of 
Indian tribes to federal reservations by working directly with the 
State of Iowa. In the 1840s most Meskwaki had been removed to 
the Indian Territory in present-day Kansas, which many tribal 
members despised because of its arid, treeless environment and 
sparse game. A small contingent returned to their homelands 
along the Iowa River, joining some Meskwaki who had never left. 
The Iowa legislature formally approved Meskwaki residency in 
an 1856 law, and the following year, the tribe purchased the 80-
acre “settlement” through an agreement with the governor. The 
settlement is not a “reservation,” as Indian lands are often called, 
because, although its legal status has changed over time, the tribe 
purchased and still owns the settlement communally. The State 
of Iowa held the settlement in trust on the condition that the Mes-
kwaki paid property taxes and abided by state laws.10  
 For the duration of the nineteenth century, Meskwaki tribal 
members adhered to their customary economic, political, and 
cultural practices. They subsisted by hunting, gardening, and oc-
casionally trading with locals and regional tribes, and continued 
to practice their clan/bundle-based religion and ceremonies.11 
9. I offer this claim tentatively. There are 566 federally recognized American
Indian nations in the United States today and some 400 unrecognized Indian 
groups. Many communities have unique landed histories, wherein title has 
been passed down from colonial land grants or through treaties, among other 
scenarios. Moreover, land purchase has become a common practice in recent 
decades. The Jamestown S’Klallam of present-day Washington State purchased 
their land several decades after the Meskwaki. See Joseph H. Stauss, The Jamestown 
S’Klallam Story: Rebuilding a Northwest Coast Indian Tribe (Sequim, WA, 2002).  
10. For a detailed account of Meskwaki history in the 1840s and 1850s, see
Michael D. Green, “ ‘We Dance in Opposite Directions’: Mesquakie (Fox) Sepa-
ratism from the Sax and Fox Tribe,” Ethnohistory 3 (1983), 129–40. See also 
Stephen Warren, “ ‘To Show the Public We Were Good Indians’: Origins and 
Meanings of the Meskwaki Powwow,” American Indian Culture and Research Jour-
nal 33 (2009), 4–5; Richard Frank Brown, “A Social History of the Mesquakie Indi-
ans, 1800–1963” (M.A. thesis, Iowa State University, 1964), 56–57; Natalie F. Joffe, 
“The Fox of Iowa,” in Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes, ed. Ralph Lin-
ton (London, 1940), 288–29; and Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 32–33. 
11. Joffe, “Fox of Iowa,” 263–64; U.S. Indian Agent Thomas S. Free, “Agency of
the Sac and Fox Indians in Iowa,” in U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Annual Report 
of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 1875 (Washing-
ton, DC, 1875), 290–91; Leander Clark, “Sacs and Foxes in Iowa,” in U.S. Office 
of Indian Affairs, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1868 (Washington, 
DC, 1868), 307, quoted in Johnathan Buffalo, “1846–1856: The Iowa Journey,” 
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Tribal members handled internal affairs as they had for centuries. 
In keeping with the tribe’s egalitarian values, leaders, who were 
drawn from kin-based clans, exerted influence “by force of per-
sonality” rather than the innate power of their chieftainship. 
Even “the [head] chief, for all of his imputed authority, was pri-
marily the spokesman for the tribe, and his power was directive, 
not coercive.”12  
 The Meskwaki conducted political affairs communally and 
went into council when decisions on specific “business of the mo-
ment [needed to be] transacted.” The council normally met on 
four occasions each year—“at corn-planting, mid-summer, [at 
the] first frost, and mid-winter”—but also gathered when im-
portant issues arose. Meetings lasted for up to four days, and all 
adult Meskwaki “voted” by offering opinions to clan leaders out-
side the council. Women, wrote one observer, did not directly 
“engage men in public debate,” and decorum precluded them 
from speaking during council. Nevertheless, Meskwaki women 
often met outside the council, developed a group opinion, and 
pressed the men of their respective households to share their po-
sition. That practice earned Meskwaki women a reputation for 
“turning public opinion this way or that.” Nevertheless, only 
council members were involved in the final decision-making 
process. Generally speaking, tribal members respected and ad-
hered to these consensual decisions.13 
 The importance of the state’s role in facilitating the Meskwaki 
land purchase, as well as its non-intrusive policy toward the tribe 
until 1896, cannot be overstated. Since the earliest years of the re-
public, states have exploited the decentralized nature of American 
federalism—that is, the ambiguity over which practices fall under 
Meskwaki History CD-ROM, ed. Johnathan Buffalo, Dawn Suzanne Wanatee, 
and Mary Bennett (Iowa City, IA, 2006). 
12. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 1. For more on customary Meskwaki gov-
ernance, see Edmunds and Peyser, Fox Wars, 37; Nancy Bonvillain, The Sac and 
Fox (New York, 1995), 30–33; and Joffe, “Fox of Iowa,” 271.  
13. Oxford Weekly Leader, 8/7/1869; Mary Alicia Owen, Folk-Lore of the Musquakie 
Indians of North America (London, 1904), 26, 33; Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 
1–2; U.S. Indian Agent W. L. Lesser, “Report of the Agent in Iowa, Report of the 
Sac and Fox Agency, Iowa,” in U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Fifty-Ninth Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 1890 
(Washington, DC, 1890), 103–6. 
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the purview of either the federal government or a given state—
in order to conduct a “gradual local assertion of direct rule over 
Indians.”14 Unlike many other states, whose policies often harmed 
Native communities, Iowa maintained a policy that treated the 
Meskwaki paternalistically but was otherwise benign through-
out the late nineteenth century. The state made no efforts to alter 
the settlement agreement or to interfere with Meskwaki self-gov-
ernance for almost 40 years, most likely because of the tribe’s ru-
ral location and peaceful but limited contact with white settlers.15 
As L. Edward Purcell writes, successive Iowa governors “seemed 
to regard seriously the trust placed upon them for the well-being 
of the tribe.”16 They not only refused to undo the tribe’s trust re-
lationship, but acted as intermediaries. Tribal leaders frequently 
contacted the governor’s office for support when federal officials 
carried out policies with which the tribe disagreed, and a co-
operative relationship developed between the Meskwaki and the 
state.17 Iowa’s acceptance of Meskwaki residency allowed tribal 
members to stabilize and reunify their community after two dis-
junctive decades, and the roughly 250 Meskwaki remained self-
sufficient and self-governing through an era infamous for the re-
pression of Native peoples.18 
14. Deborah A. Rosen, American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race, and Cit-
izenship, 1790–1880 (Lincoln, NE, 2007), xi.  
15. U.S. Indian Agent Leander Clark, “Sacs and Foxes in Iowa,” in Message of the 
President of the United States and Accompanying Documents to the Two Houses of 
Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress, 1867 
(Washington, DC, 1867), 25–26. On the Meskwakis’ good relations with their 
white neighbors, see Peter Hoehnle, “Die Colonisten und Die Indianer: The Un-
usual Relationship between the Meskwaki Nation and the Amana Society,” 
Iowa Heritage Illustrated 92 (2011), 90–99. 
16. L. Edward Purcell, “The Meskwaki Indian Settlement in 1905,” Palimpsest 55
(1974), 35.  
17. For examples of times the tribe contacted Iowa governors for support during 
disagreements with the federal government, see the correspondence between 
Leander Clark and Governor Buren R. Sherman from July 1882, in Correspond-
ence, Miscellaneous, Indian Affairs, 1860–1887, RG 43 Governor, State Historical 
Society of Iowa, Des Moines (hereafter SHSI-DM).
18. Buffalo, “1846–1856.” On the permeability of tribal boundaries, see Jacki
Thompson Rand, “Primary Sources: Indian Goods and the History of American 
Colonialism and the 19th-Century Reservation,” in Clearing a Path: Theorizing the 
Past in Native American Studies, ed. Nancy Shoemaker (New York, 2002), 136–37. 
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IN STARK CONTRAST to their relationship with the state, the 
Meskwaki were at odds with the federal government from the 
settlement’s earliest days. The tribe’s religion, economy, and po-
litical structure did not comport with the assimilatory agenda 
pursued by the OIA throughout the period. Federal administra-
tors demanded that Native peoples across the country convert to 
Christianity, commit to a life of sedentary agriculture on individ-
ually owned plots of land, and embrace American-style democ-
racy. The agency undertook strident efforts to force these changes 
upon Native Americans, including the Meskwaki, throughout the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.19  
 In an effort to force the Meskwaki back to Kansas, the agency 
convinced Congress to withdraw federal recognition from the 
tribe upon its exodus from the Indian Territory in 1856. As Amer-
ican Indian policy scholar Brian Klopotek explains, “Federal rec-
ognition establishes a political and legal relationship between a 
tribe and the United States that carries particular rights and re-
sponsibilities for both parties under federal law.”20 By revoking 
the tribe’s recognition, then, the government could deny any re-
sponsibility to uphold the terms of earlier treaties, and refused to 
pay the Meskwaki the annuities that had contributed to the tribe’s 
cash coffers for decades. OIA administrators assumed that with-
out those funds, the tribe would be unable to survive and would 
return to Kansas, where it could be confined and controlled.21 
Even without those funds, however, the Meskwaki continued 
to coexist peacefully with surrounding communities. Although 
tribal members may have been poor by white standards, the tribe 
as a whole did not suffer critically without its annuities; it sub-
sisted, and during tough times some Meskwaki reached out to 
the state government or nearby settlers for support.22 
19. See Frederick E. Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians 
(Lincoln, NE, 2001). 
20. Brian Klopotek, Recognition Odysseys: Indigeneity, Race, and Federal Tribal 
Recognition Policy in Three Louisiana Indian Communities (Durham, NC, 2001), 2–3.  
21. Lewis V. Bogy to Leander Clark, 11/17/1866, quoted in Johnathan Buffalo, 
“1867–1886: The New Neighbors,” Meskwaki History CD-ROM. See also Warren, 
“To Show the Public We Were Good Indians,” 5; Brown, “Social History,” 42–46. 
22. See Green, “We Dance in Opposite Directions,” 138; George L. Davenport to 
Samuel J. Kirkwood, 9/26/1862, Correspondence, Miscellaneous, Indian Affairs, 
1860–1887, RG 43 Governor, SHSI-DM. 
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 After a decade, the OIA realized that its strategy had not bro-
ken the Meskwaki, and Congress restored the tribe’s federally 
recognized status. The OIA paid annuities—some $5,588 (nearly 
$90,000 in 2013 dollars)—to the Meskwaki in the spring of 1867.23 
From the government’s perspective, this recognition provided a 
legal mechanism through which the United States could once 
again oversee the tribe as a “domestic dependent nation” and 
subject it to OIA authority—an effort that coincided with the fed-
eral government’s reinvigorated interest in Indian affairs follow-
ing the Civil War. Accordingly, the agency constructed an office 
near the settlement and assigned agent Leander Clark to the 
Meskwaki. His primary responsibility was to pay annuities to 
the tribe, but by “continually attempt[ing] to interest” tribal 
members “in settling permanently on farms,” Clark and his suc-
cessors also sought to carry out the OIA’s broader agenda and to 
push tribal members toward assimilation.24  
 The OIA attempted religious conversion, education, and the 
management of tribal affairs in accordance with its overarching 
goals to “civilize” all Natives into “docile believers in American 
progress.”25 The OIA built a schoolhouse on the settlement and 
a pan-Indian school near the agency headquarters in nearby To-
ledo. Over the years, these facilities collaborated with churches on 
and near the settlement to expedite assimilation.26 Some years 
23. Joffe, “Fox of Iowa,” 289. According to Green, “We Dance in Opposite Di-
rections,” 138, although the federal government “did not explicitly recognize 
the Mesquakies, it did quite obviously recognize the existence of a distinct band 
of the ‘Sacs and Foxes’ who were separated physically from the rest of the 
‘united tribe.’” Indeed, the question of Meskwaki recognition as a distinct tribal 
entity remained unclear until 1901, when a court declared the tribe autonomous 
in Peters v. Malin. See Angela Keysor, “Emergence of a Distinct Legal Identity 
from the Forces of Assimilation: The Mesquakie Indians and the Fight for Citi-
zenship, 1842–1912,” Meskwaki History CD-ROM. 
24. Brown, “Social History,” 60. See also Hoxie, Final Promise, 2–3.
25. Hoxie, Final Promise, xvii.
26. Clark, “No. 85, Agency of Sac and Fox Indians in Iowa,” in U.S. Office of
Indian Affairs, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1872 (Wash-
ington, DC, 1872), 515–16; Clark to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Eli S. Parker, 
1871, quoted in Buffalo, “1867–1886: The New Neighbors”; Clark, “Sac and 
Foxes in Iowa No. 125, Agency of the Sac and Fox Indians Residing in the State 
of Iowa,” in Message of the President of the United States and Accompanying Docu-
ments to the Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Second Session of 
the Fortieth Congress (Washington, DC, 1867), 349. For further information on the 
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later, the OIA even burned the settlement village with the dual 
purpose of tempering a smallpox outbreak and dispersing the 
Meskwaki onto individual sections scattered throughout tribal 
land.27 Still, the Meskwaki refused the agency’s vision of individ-
ual land ownership, and the tribe continued to share the settle-
ment, following a usufruct system: Families selected a section of 
the settlement to occupy, constructed their dwellings, and culti-
vated small subsistence gardens. Tribal members passed on their 
use of a particular portion of the settlement to their descendants.28  
 The government’s decision to recognize the Meskwaki re-
flected, at least in part, an OIA strategy aimed at nudging the 
tribe away from subsistence and toward the local cash economy. 
From the Meskwaki perspective, however, it also created an op-
portunity for the tribe to exercise its sovereignty and tilt its pre-
carious position between the state and federal governments to its 
advantage. Immediately upon receiving their payment in 1867, 
tribal members asked Clark to set aside $2,000 of their annuities 
to purchase additional settlement lands. Clark agreed, and the 
tribe convinced him to facilitate its property purchases through-
out his tenure. Despite the overarching assimilative agenda of 
the agency for which he worked—and its preference that the 
Meskwaki remain in Kansas—Clark was in some respects sym-
pathetic to tribal concerns over handling their own affairs. He 
proved open to cooperating with the tribe, and tribal members 
even persuaded him to allow other Meskwaki to rejoin their 
growing community in Iowa.29  
use of boarding schools to fuse religious conversion and non-Indian education 
to further the project of assimilation, see John Troutman, “The Citizenship of 
Dance: Politics of Music among the Lakota, 1900–1924,” in Beyond Red Power: 
American Indian Politics and Activism Since 1900, ed. Daniel M. Cobb and Loretta 
Fowler (Santa Fe, NM, 2007), 91–108; and Clifford E. Trafzer, Jean A. Keller, and 
Lorene Sisquoc, eds., Boarding School Blues: Revisiting American Indian Educa-
tional Experiences (Lincoln, NE, 2006). 
27. Warren, “To Show the Public We Were Good Indians,” 2–3, explores how 
the 1901 village burning fit the OIA’s assimilationist agenda.  
28. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 34.  
29. Joffe, “Fox of Iowa,” 289; Leander Clark to E. S. Parker, “Second Quarter Re-
port, 1867,” 5/17/1867, file “Leander Clark—Correspondence 1866–69, 1872 
Copies of Letters,” box BL 57, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City (here-
after SHSI-IC); Clark to E. B. Fenn, 2/24/1868, ibid.  
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 From 1867 forward, writes one historian, the Meskwaki had 
“an almost fanatic desire” to purchase land as opportunities arose, 
and the settlement grew to over 3,000 acres by 1915.30 Very few 
sources from this era provide Meskwaki perspectives, but it ap-
pears that they had a prescient and pragmatic understanding of 
their position vis-à-vis the state and federal governments. Al-
though federal recognition provided an opportunity for the OIA 
to establish local offices and schools and to pressure the tribe to 
assimilate, it also secured valuable cash assets the Meskwaki could 
30. Brown, “Social History,” 59; Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 33.
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use to purchase their land via their trust relationship with the 
state. In this way, tribal members negotiated their relationships 
with both governments and capitalized on the decentralized 
nature of the American federal system to protect and affirm Mes-
kwaki sovereignty. Because “sovereignty takes material form 
and is built with material resources,” as the anthropologist Jes-
sica R. Cattelino argues, it is clear that by expanding its land base, 
the tribe could subsist, stabilize its population, create a physical 
buffer between itself and its neighbors, and prepare for future 
growth.31  
 Meskwaki political maneuvering also spared them from two 
of the most destructive epochs in the history of federal Indian 
policy. First, they were largely unaffected by the so-called Indian 
Wars between 1850 and 1890. Instead, they maintained generally 
peaceful relations with their white neighbors.32 Second, the tribe 
avoided the ravages brought on by the 1887 Dawes Act, which 
established the allotment policy that dispossessed Native peoples 
nationwide of some 80 million acres of land by 1934.33 The Mes-
kwaki escaped that fate precisely because their ownership of 
the settlement helped insulate them from the unilateral authority 
Congress held over federally assigned reservations.  
 Over the next several decades, tribal members opposed even 
subtle OIA efforts to control their affairs. In 1876, for example, 
the federal government mandated that all tribal members had to 
register with the agency in order to receive annuities. Most Mes-
kwaki grew suspicious of the government’s motives and refused 
to register, leading the OIA to punitively withhold annuities—
just as it had during the decade before they were re-recognized 
in 1866. Much was at stake. The tribe did not rely completely on 
the annuities for subsistence, but the purchase of additional land 
31. Jessica R. Cattelino, High Stakes: Florida Seminole Gaming and Sovereignty 
(Durham, NC, 2008), 128.  
32. A.R.F., “The Indians of Iowa,” Daily Iowa State Register, 11/18/1869. On “In-
dian Wars and Skirmishes,” see Walter R. Echo-Hawk, In the Courts of the Con-
queror: The Ten Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided (Golden, CO, 2010), 137.  
33. Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 
(Cambridge, MA, 2005), 256–92; Douglas E. Foley, “The Fox Project: A Re-
appraisal,” Current Anthropology 40 (1999), 187. The Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, 
49th Cong., 2nd sess. (2/8/1887), 388, is also known as the General Allotment 
Act or simply the Dawes Act.  
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depended in part on the funds. Led by the chief’s council, the 
Meskwaki refused to sign the rolls. The ensuing stalemate lasted 
nearly six years, with the tribe capitulating only after the lack of 
revenue led them to default on their property taxes in 1878, and 
the Secretary of the Interior personally assured Meskwaki leaders 
that enrollment would not decrease their annuities. Technically, 
the default breached the trust agreement with the state, and the 
Tama County government claimed the settlement briefly, but in 
title only. In an expression of ongoing cooperation, Iowa extended 
the deadline for payment to late 1882, which the tribe met.34  
 During this episode, the Meskwaki narrowly avoided an effort 
to dismantle the settlement and force them back to Kansas. In 1878 
combined pressure from the OIA and angry petitions from some 
Iowans nearly spurred Iowa to terminate its trust relationship 
with the tribe and almost prompted the U.S. Congress to remove 
them once again.35 The OIA supported that effort, believing that 
returning the Meskwaki to the tightly controlled Indian Territory 
would speed their assimilation. But many locals supported the 
tribe and petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, express-
ing their belief “that it would be an act of great injustice . . . and a 
breach of faith on our part, to remove [the tribe] without their con-
sent, from their own lands which they have purchased.” These 
neighbors viewed the Meskwaki as “peaceable, quiet, honest and 
law abiding people [who] compare[d] favorably in their obedience 
to the laws with the . . . whites surrounding them.” Iowa legisla-
tors sympathized with that view and did not alter their relation-
ship with the Meskwaki. Assimilationists, however, still held 
sway in Washington, D.C. In early 1878 a resolution for the tribe’s 
removal made it through the House of Representatives. Fortu-
nately for the Meskwaki, who were “unanimously and utterly ad-
verse” to the prospect of returning to Kansas, the resolution 
failed to pass the Senate, and the issue was not reconsidered.36  
34. Brown, “Social History,” 61–63.
35. “To the Hon. Geo. W. McCrary, Secretary of War,” 5/14/1878; and “To the
Hon. Commission of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C.,” both quoted in Buffalo, 
“1867–1886: The New Neighbors.”  
36. “To the Hon. Commission of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C.,” quoted in
Buffalo, “1867–1886: The New Neighbors”; A. R. Howbert, 1873, ibid.; T. A. Gra-
ham to John R. Rankin, 4/30/1878, ibid. 
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DESPITE the relative strength of their tribal sovereignty and 
their ability to elude these various attacks on their residency in 
Iowa, the Meskwaki did not completely avoid the corrosive ef-
fects of shifting federal Indian policy at the end of the nineteenth 
century. As thousands of American Indians died in confronta-
tions with the U.S. military and from starvation on ill-supplied 
reservations, the Meskwaki continued to subsist in relative 
obscurity through the 1880s. Yet they remained vulnerable to 
increasing pressures to intervene in their affairs. Such threats 
would abruptly and fundamentally alter the Meskwaki ability to 
exercise their sovereignty by century’s end. In 1888, for example, 
and despite the tribe’s previous aversion to the practice, the OIA 
completed its first official Meskwaki census, listing 381 tribal 
members on government rolls.37  
 An even more substantive change took place in 1891, when 
the OIA accelerated its efforts to reform tribal governments 
nationwide. That February, Congress authorized the creation of 
“tribal business councils” that “could make decisions on behalf 
of the tribe in transactions involving tribal or nonallotted lands.” 
That initiative undermined tribes’ chosen systems of governance 
by imposing a managerial formation with democratic overtones. 
Business councils would replace any existing form of tribal gov-
ernance—for the Meskwaki, the chief-council system—and re-
quire that council members be elected by majority vote, thereby 
decreasing the power of clans, the chief, and decision making by 
consensus. In keeping with the American exclusion of women 
from the vote—and contrary to Meskwaki practice—only men 
would be allowed to participate in OIA business council elections. 
Because the settlement was technically “non-allotted land,” the 
Meskwaki could have organized a business council, but they re-
fused, deeply frustrating the OIA. One agent complained that Mes-
kwaki obstinacy was “the worst problem to deal with . . . among 
any of the Indians” in the country. He advocated “break[ing]” 
tribal leaders’ “power and influence” to strengthen OIA control.38 
37. Enos Gheen to John D. C. Atkins, 7/20/1888, microcopy 595, roll 450, Indian 
Census Rolls, 1885–1940, Sac and Fox, IA, 1888–1910, National Archives Micro-
film Publications (Washington, DC, 1965). 
38. Loretta Fowler, Arapahoe Politics, 1851–1978: Symbols in Crises of Authority 
(Lincoln, NE, 1982), 98; Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 4; Horace M. Rebok, 
                                                 
Meskwaki Fight for Self-Governance       325 
 To do so, the trust relationship between the tribe and the state 
also had to be broken. This issue erupted in 1895. Some local 
whites organized a branch of the Indian Rights Association, a na-
tional group of assimilationist Christian reformers who believed 
in the destruction of Indian religions, languages, governance, and 
communal land ownership.39 The group lobbied to transfer the 
settlement from Iowa to the United States, a strategy many state 
legislators also increasingly supported—even if only as a way to 
quiet this surge in local unrest. Illustrating this dramatic turn in 
the state’s Indian policy, Iowa Governor Francis M. Drake advo-
cated assimilation for the Meskwaki, apologetically telling them 
that adopting American culture was “the better way to live.”40  
 On June 10, 1896, the political tide of American colonialism, 
which the Meskwaki had skirted for so long, swept in. Bowing to 
pressure from assimilationists, the state transferred jurisdiction 
and the land trust to the federal government, giving it the same 
legal status as other tribal lands. Congress accepted the transfer 
the same day, officially making the federal government the sole 
trustee over the Meskwaki settlement. Yet questions over the 
status of Meskwaki land, taxation, and criminal jurisdiction would 
continue well into the twentieth century.41  
 Despite these ambiguities, and the fact that the tribe owned 
and controlled its land, the 1896 transfer put the Meskwaki in a 
position shared by almost every other American Indian tribe: in 
an unequal trust with, and thus highly subordinate to, an over-
zealous OIA. Native scholar Walter Echo-Hawk has argued that 
the OIA’s “powers over Indian tribes reached their zenith” at that 
“Report of Agent in Iowa, Report of Sac and Fox Agency,” in U.S. Office of Indian 
Affairs, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 
1895 (Washington, DC, 1896), 165–69. 
39. Benay Blend, “The Indian Rights Association, the Allotment Policy, and the 
Five Civilized Tribes, 1923–1936,” American Indian Quarterly 7 (1983), 67. 
40. “Indians Claim Damages,” Annals of Iowa 3 (1897), 130–34. 
41. Sacs and Foxes of the Mississippi [Jurisdictional Transfer], 54th Cong., 1st sess., 
6/10/1896, 598. Brown, “Social History,” 65, notes that “the State of Iowa . . . 
retained control over any judicial process within the settlement, jurisdiction of 
crimes against the laws of Iowa committed within the settlement by Indians or 
others, and the privilege of establishing and maintaining highways . . . [as well 
as] eminent domain over Indian lands for state and county purposes.” On the 
application of Iowa law to the Meskwaki, see also Joffe, “Fox of Iowa,” 311–12; 
and Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 48–57.  
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time. For about 50 years, beginning in 1886, the agency took In-
dian land across the country, increased its paternalistic control 
over tribal affairs, and cleared the way for the total “assimilation 
of Indians into settler society.”42 Although the tribe still owned 
its settlement and would continue to pay state taxes for decades, 
and although legal questions over the first land purchase in 1857 
delayed the transfer, the federal government finally took all of 
the settlement lands into trust in 1908.43 As Meskwaki author and 
elder Donald Wanatee writes, his tribe suddenly found itself “gov-
erned under a separate law, administered by members of the 
White community” and increasingly “in a position of definite 
subordination” to the OIA.44 The tribe would struggle to main-
tain its sovereignty in coming years, but its ability to negotiate 
with the federal government and manage its affairs was nearly 
broken during the first several decades of the twentieth century. 
  
THE 1896 TRUST TRANSFER had opened the Meskwaki to 
external influence, but a key part of the ensuing political trans-
formation was rooted in an intratribal controversy that had be-
gun 15 years earlier. The dispute soon created a deep political 
schism that—with much encouragement from the OIA—
damaged the tribe’s ability to assert self-governance as the nine-
teenth century came to a close. At the height of the enrollment 
stalemate in 1881 an influential chief named Mamiwanige died. 
He had presided over the tribe since it established the settlement. 
Upon Mamiwanige’s death, his eldest son succeeded to his lead-
ership position, per tribal custom. That son, however, also died 
just a few weeks later. Faced with a leadership vacuum, the 
chief’s council acted quickly to install a new leader named Push-
etonequa.45 
 That decision had long-lasting effects on tribal politics. Most 
Meskwaki initially accepted the council’s decision to recognize 
Pushetonequa as chief. But the seeds of discord had been sown: 
42. Echo-Hawk, Courts of the Conqueror, 189–91.  
43. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 33.  
44. Donald Wanatee, “The Lion, Fleur-de-lis, the Eagle, or the Fox: A Study of 
Government,” in Worlds Between Two Rivers, 79.  
45. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 3–5; Brown, “Social History,” 62–63.  
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In order to seat Pushetonequa, the council bypassed two of Ma-
miwanige’s younger sons, who were considered “too young and 
incompetent” for the chieftainship. Thus, a dispute over tribal 
custom and hereditary right began to ferment. In the meantime, 
Pushetonequa led the tribe toward the twentieth century with his 
people’s general support.46  
 In the late 1890s, many local whites still supported the Indian 
Rights Association and the OIA; they fervently believed in assim-
ilation and noted their frustration with the tribe’s success in re-
pelling any such efforts. The 1896 trust transfer had been a major 
victory for the reformers, who quickly set about further efforts to 
undermine tribal sovereignty and “civilize” the Meskwaki.47 The 
transfer itself had provided the U.S. the authority to purchase 
land in Tama County for federal schools to manage Meskwaki 
education.48 Observing the agency’s continued inability to assim-
ilate tribal members, Congress authorized the construction of a 
pan-Indian boarding school next to the Indian Office in Toledo.49 
 When the OIA ordered the Meskwaki to enroll their children 
at the new school, tribal families unanimously refused. In No-
vember 1898 Pushetonequa and several councilmen traveled to 
the nation’s capital, where the OIA attempted to bribe Push-
etonequa with an official designation as the “Head [Meskwaki] 
Chief” and a $500 annual salary. He declined. The government 
next threatened to send children from other tribes to the settle-
ment school. That, the OIA said, would lead to eventual inter-
marriage with other tribes—a practice many Meskwaki opposed 
for fear of diluting their annuities across a larger population. 
Pushetonequa acquiesced, and he and several council members 
enrolled their children in mid-December. Their decision was 
unpopular, and most Meskwaki opposed the boarding school for 
46. Wanatee, “Study of Government,” 79; Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 3.
47. Horace M. Rebok, History of the Indian Rights Association of Iowa and the Found-
ing of the Indian Training School (Toledo, IA, 1897); H. Sutherland, “That Indian 
Scare,” Midland Monthly 8 (1897), 519.  
48. “An Act Tendering to the United States Jurisdiction over Certain Indians
Residing in Iowa and over Their Lands, and the Privilege of Purchasing Land 
in Tama County for Indian School Purposes” (2/14/1896), Acts and Resolutions 
Passed at the Regular Session of the 26th General Assembly of the State of Iowa, ch. 110 
(1896), 114–15.   
49. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 35; Brown, “Social History,” 69–70.
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another decade. Low enrollment forced its eventual conversion 
into a sanatorium for tuberculosis patients in 1911.50 
 Pushetonequa’s concession to the OIA deepened the growing 
dispute over his leadership. As early as 1898, one of Mamiwa-
nige’s bypassed sons, Oldbear, began disparaging Pushetonequa 
as a corrupt “government chief.” Oldbear and his supporters 
framed Pushetonequa’s acquiescence as greedy and against tribal 
interests, using it as a polemical issue to bolster Oldbear’s claim 
to hereditary leadership.51 Anthropologist Douglas Foley suggests 
a lack of any evidence supporting Oldbear’s claim that clan 
requirements or hierarchies could preclude anyone, including 
Pushetonequa, from tribal leadership positions. Thus the entire 
chieftainship dispute may have “hinge[d] on how strict” tribal 
succession rules were.52  
 Nevertheless, the disagreement perpetuated an “ongoing frac-
ture” in the community and eventually morphed into an ideolog-
ical battle that changed Meskwaki politics.53 This new politics 
only worsened after the OIA recognized Pushetonequa as the 
head chief in 1900—the same title it had offered in 1898. The 
chief’s detractors quickly derided him “as a pawn in the white 
man’s assimilation policy,” and rumors about his true allegiance 
quickly spread across the settlement. The controversy slowly 
overtook tribal politics, and tribal members, local whites, and 
OIA agents began to measure political turmoil on the settlement 
by constructing a crude cultural binary that divided the tribe. 
In their paradigm, “Youngbears” supported Pushetonequa and 
were seen as “progressive” supporters of acculturation. The “Old-
bears,” on the other hand, were considered “anti-white” and 
“culturally conservative.”54  
50. Brown, “Social History,” 69–70; Lisa Dianne Lykins, “ ‘Curing the Indian’: 
Therapeutic Care and Acculturation at the Sac and Fox Tuberculosis Sanato-
rium, 1912–1942” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 2002). 
51. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 5; Brown, “Social History,” 68. 
52. Douglas E. Foley, The Heartland Chronicles (Philadelphia, 1995), 153–55. 
53. Warren, “To Show the Public We Were Good Indians,” 8.  
54. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 5; Foley, Heartland Chronicles, 153–54; Lisa 
Peattie, “Being a Mesquakie Indian,” in Documentary History of the Fox Project, 
1928–1959: A Program in Action Anthropology Directed by Sol Tax, ed. Fred Gear-
ing, Robert McC. Netting, and Lisa R. Peattie (Chicago, 1960), 48.  
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 Scholars have overemphasized this factional split as the cen-
tral organizing theme of modern Meskwaki politics, in part 
because they have failed to adequately recognize OIA efforts to 
perpetuate and enflame political tensions in order to divide and 
control the tribe. But, as Judith M. Daubenmier writes, the 
Oldbear/Youngbear binary is “vague [and] simplistic” and does 
not accurately depict the ongoing Meskwaki conversations over 
tribal governance.55 Meskwaki disagreement over Pushetonequa’s 
leadership certainly existed, and those vying for power often flung 
rhetoric framing the battle as one between progressives and con-
servatives. But tribal politics were never clearly dichotomous, 
and many tribal members did not identify with either faction. 
Rather, tribal leaders and their constituents alike attempted to 
determine the best course for their people during a chaotic and, at 
times, politically acerbic period, and to make their voices heard.56 
 Shedding light on the ways Meskwaki political discord 
played into the government’s hands does not absolve some in-
transigent tribal members of their role in exacerbating a difficult 
political situation, but it does reveal the ways OIA agents ex-
ploited a tense political situation to further their assimilatory goals. 
The OIA recognized the opportunity created by the Meskwaki 
leadership dispute and endeavored to weaken the tribe’s ability 
to resist agency initiatives. Horace M. Rebok, the tribe’s agent 
55. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 37. Such “factional binaries” have
long been used to describe political discord within Indian tribes and have varied 
across Native contexts. For more on the perceived intersections of genetics and 
cultural awareness, see, for example, Lambert, Choctaw Nation, 37; Scott Richard 
Lyons, X-Marks: Native Signatures of Assent (Minneapolis, 2010); and Larry Nesper, 
The Walleye War: The Struggle for Ojibwe Spearfishing and Treaty Rights (Lincoln, 
NE, 2002), 185–97.  
56. Other examples of the tendency to view Native leaders as ensnared in a rigid 
and intractable politics are challenged in Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. 
Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (New York, 2004), 7; and Ben-
jamin R. Kratch, “Kiowa Religion: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of Ritual Symbol-
ism, 1832–1987” (Ph.D. diss., Southern Methodist University, 1989), 618. Ostler 
argues that “it is more productive to realize that Sioux leaders adopted a range 
of strategies based on reasoned assessments of changing conditions and possi-
bilities.” They “were not always locked into polar antagonisms” but instead 
“adjusted their tactics in light of new circumstances and were responsive to 
changing opinion[s] among their people,” and all tried to do the “tough political 
work of mending fences and building unity.” All of this was aimed toward 
shared goals: the survival of their people and the defense of their sovereignty. 
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until 1899 and founder of the Iowa branch of the Indian Rights As-
sociation, remained committed, as he had so bluntly exclaimed 
three years earlier, to breaking the tribal leaders’ power. He and 
his successors continued to wedge the tribe against itself. As a 
result of this continual prodding, by roughly 1905, Meskwaki po-
litical divisions had grown so entrenched that two separate tribal 
councils existed. One was sanctioned by the OIA and led by Push-
etonequa and his supporters; the other was led by the Oldbears. 
Both sides vied for support from tribal members, while OIA 
agents fueled the already aggressive discourse, calculating that 
“the tribe was easier to control when divided” against itself.57  
 Given the various challenges facing the tribe throughout this 
period it is not surprising that the agency successfully provoked 
the Meskwaki devolution into a pronounced and vitriolic politics. 
In addition to the settlement trust transfer in 1896, deep changes 
that accompanied the turn of the twentieth century proved equally 
daunting. During the first three decades of the new century, res-
idents of the Meskwaki settlement underwent substantial social 
and economic changes. The settlement’s population had doubled 
since the 1850s. More than 90 Meskwaki children attended OIA 
schools in neighboring states for part of the year, while a few 
Meskwaki lived and worked in urban areas like Des Moines.58 In 
1905 only about 15 framed houses had stood on the settlement; 
the majority of homes were still wickiups, the domed dwellings 
tribal members had customarily used. But by 1927 most Mes-
kwaki lived in small “American-style” homes; only three families 
lived full-time in wickiups.59 The Meskwaki, like other tribes, 
57. Foley, Heartland Chronicles, 153–55. 
58. Ira D. Nelson, “1936 Annual Statistical Report,” 1–8, in file Annual Reports 
051, 1935–1943, box 114, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sac & Fox Agency, RG 75, 
National Archives and Records Administration, Great Lakes, Chicago (hereaf-
ter cited as NARAGL); George Young Bear, “Mesquakie News Tells of History: 
George Young Bear Gives Facts about Indian Education,” Toledo Chronicle, 
11/22/1928. For a Meskwaki account of the assimilation project and the board-
ing school system, see Adeline Wanatee, “Education, the Family, and the 
Schools,” in Worlds Between Two Rivers, 100–103. 
59. Duren H. Ward Collection, BL21, folder 11, SHSI-IC; John J. Sullivan, “Sac 
and Fox Agency and Sanatorium, Iowa,” 9, Report to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, Samuel A. Elliot Collection, #9165 Series I, Board of Indian Commission-
ers Reports, box 5C, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell Uni-
versity Library, Ithaca, NY; C. M. Richards, “Tama Indians Abandon Wickiups 
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increasingly struggled to subsist via local hunting and farming.60 
The tribe leased settlement land to local farmers to pay property 
taxes. Individuals continued to farm small plots of land and hunt 
near their homes, while many men also began laboring for rail-
roads, factories, and farms. Several owned tractors and other tools, 
and more than 40 owned horses.61 English grew prevalent, though 
most continued to speak fluent Meskwaki.62 Tribal members ex-
plored faiths ranging from their customary clan/bundle ceremo-
nies to the Native American Church and various Christian sects.63 
They also “converted . . . culture into a commodity” by develop-
ing a powwow festival in 1913, performing for thousands of 
white tourists.64 Women made souvenir jewelry and toys for sale 
to tourists.65 One entrepreneurial Meskwaki even took to “rais-
ing silver foxes,” presumably for sale locally.66 By forcing tribal 
members to carefully consider the best strategies for tribal eco-
nomic, social, and political survival, these changes shaped Mes-
kwaki politics as the tribe struggled to maintain its sovereignty 
in the early twentieth century.  
 Under these circumstances, the OIA incrementally increased 
control over Meskwaki governance. Although Oldbears continued 
for Modern Homes; Progress in Last Few Years Was Greatest in History,” Toledo 
Chronicle, 12/15/1927.  
60. Warren, “To Show the Public We Were Good Indians,” 21.
61. Joffe, “Fox of Iowa,” 302–3.
62. Ibid., 294; “1936 Annual Statistical Report,” 1, file Annual Reports 051, 1935–
1943, box 114, NARAGL; “100 Persons from Our County Hear Story of Indian,” 
Newton News, 4/18/1935. 
63. Peattie, “Being a Mesquakie Indian,” 44–46; “Percy Bear,” Surveys of Indian 
Industry, 1921–1926, box 1, NARAGL; “1936 Annual Statistical Report,” 1–11, 
file “Annual Reports 051, 1935–1943,” box 114, NARAGL; Donald Grant, “The 
Indian-Union of Primitive, Modern Culture: Radios, Newspapers, Cookstoves, 
Modern Homes Fail to Crowd Out Age-Old Customs at Tama Reservation,” Des 
Moines Register, 6/17/1934. See also Buffalo, “The Meskwaki World amid Centu-
ries of Spiritual Assault: Historical Perspective on Alien Belief Systems Imposed 
on the Meskwaki Tribe,” unpublished manuscript, folder “Buffalo, Johnathan L., 
The Meskwaki World amid Centuries of Spiritual Assault 2012,” SHSI-IC. 
64. Warren, “To Show the Public We Were Good Indians,” 21; Sol Tax, “The
Social Organization of the Fox Indians” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 
1935), in Gearing et al., Documentary History, 5–6. 
65. Nelson, “Annual Report, January 1, 1935,” file “Annual Reports 051, 1931–
1935,” box 113, NARAGL; Tax, “Social Organization,” 5. 
66. Grant, “The Indian.”
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to criticize Pushetonequa, his cooperation with the OIA actually 
remained limited. Whites viewed him as a hindrance to assimi-
lation, and even famed anthropologist George Bird Grinnell 
opined that the chief’s frequent opposition held the tribe back.67 
Yet discord prevailed. In early 1914 some 200 tribal members pe-
titioned that Pushetonequa be replaced with Peter Old Bear, one 
of his primary political rivals. Although their demand was not 
met, OIA Superintendent Robert L. Russell seized the opportu-
nity to increase federal control. Lamenting the Oldbear/Young-
bear dispute as irreconcilable, he characterized the tribe as dys-
functional and its politics as detrimental to assimilation. That 
March, Russell asked the OIA for the authority to appoint the 
Meskwaki chief’s council—a responsibility usually left to the chief. 
The tribe attempted to maintain control of the council and of-
fered to reduce it from 12 members to 5, whom they would elect 
directly. Meanwhile, several Oldbears again petitioned the OIA 
to repeal Pushetonequa’s title. Recognizing the importance of 
maintaining a veneer of tribal authority, the OIA decided to tem-
porarily leave the chief in his position and the council at 12 mem-
bers. This apparent equilibrium did not last long. By October 1914, 
the OIA superintendent was unilaterally selecting council mem-
bers, enabling the agency to drastically reduce Pushetonequa’s 
authority. The effects of these intrusive OIA strategies were stag-
gering. Indeed, tribal historian Johnathan Buffalo argues that af-
ter the loss of power to select council members, Pushetonequa’s 
“potency to act” as a tribal leader “was broken.”68 
 From that point until 1929, Meskwaki governance took the 
form of an agency-appointed business council. That was a far cry 
from self-governance as it had existed before 1896 and was also 
eerily similar to the tribal business councils the OIA had unsuc-
cessfully attempted to form in the 1890s. Nearly subsumed by 
OIA pressure, the council struggled to maintain any semblance 
of the authority it previously wielded. The OIA incrementally 
tightened its grip on local authority by reducing the council from 
12 members to 5 and refused to recognize a new chief following 
Pushetonequa’s death in 1919. Without clear leadership and still 
67. George Bird Grinnell, The Indians of To-day (New York, 1915), 283. 
68. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 7–8.  
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grappling with partisanship, the council “refused to meet for a 
year” until the OIA replaced it. The new group also held “little 
or no authority” and functioned only to “validate agency deci-
sions, to communicate these decisions [to the tribe], and to report 
tribal community reactions” to agency decrees.69  
 Although the Meskwaki stood at a disadvantage to the OIA 
after 1919, tribal members remained politically active and never 
abandoned their quest for local control. The Indian Citizenship 
Act of 1924 conferred federal citizenship on all Native Americans 
in the United States; thereafter, many Meskwaki vociferously ex-
ercised their newfound vote in non-tribal elections. Even as the 
OIA managed tribal “schools . . . police, and most of their domes-
tic affairs,” as one Iowan wrote, many Meskwaki took great in-
terest in education and government. Seventy-seven Meskwaki 
voted in the 1924 election, their first as U.S. citizens.70  
 In 1928 several Meskwaki—possibly exploring strategies for 
reaffirming their control over local activities—sent a letter to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs Charles H. Burke about remov-
ing the tribe from federal trusteeship. In order to do so, he re-
sponded, the tribe would have to agree to fully allot the settle-
ment into individually owned parcels. They did not.71  
 That same year the tribe launched a series of efforts to reclaim 
its governance. It held several meetings over the course of a month 
and nominated an Oldbear as chief who then selected a council. 
The tribe sought OIA recognition of this new government’s au-
thority, but the agency dodged the effort by insisting that the 
council be democratically elected. In May 1929 tribal members 
elected a seven-member council split between Oldbears and 
Youngbears. This attempt at bipartisanship, a reporter wrote, 
came with “great expectations” for a new era of political cooper-
ation. The two groups, however, could not agree on several is-
sues and, at various times, refused to meet. The tribe called sev-
eral additional elections, each time hoping to seat a functioning 
69. Ibid., 7–9; Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 39. 
70. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, 68th Cong., 1st sess. (6/2/1924); Edgar R. Har-
lan to Mildred Hutchins, April 1936, file 49D, part 10, group 2, Edgar R. Harlan 
Papers, SHSI-DM; “Story of the Tama Indians,” Boone News-Republican, 4/5/1928.  
71. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 10–11.  
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council. Eventually, five elders organized an acting council, but 
even then one coalition dominated.72  
 These post-1928 councils never achieved meaningful authority, 
although efforts to replace the acting council with an elected one 
continued until 1934. The OIA, however, stifled Meskwaki ef-
forts at self-governance by consistently refusing to recognize any 
council “without a written constitution and without full tribal 
consent.”73 Even the acting council recognized its limitations; 
when an OIA agent asked it to settle a domestic relations dispute 
between two tribal members, the councilors stated that they “did 
not consider their authority sufficient to act as arbitrators . . . or 
even to make a recommendation.”74 
 The Great Depression added economic strife to political tur-
moil. Before it began, Richard Brown writes, the Meskwaki were 
“poor” but “experienced no actual destitution.”75 The tribe’s sub-
sistence practices and recent efforts at economic diversification 
kept them afloat. But tribal members suffered more than most of 
their white neighbors because, as OIA Superintendent Jacob 
Breid remarked in early 1934, they did not have “a fair chance to 
get a job” until employment in white communities stabilized.76 
Charities as far away as Des Moines and programs like the Civil-
ian Conservation Corps–Indian Division and the Indian Relief 
and Rehabilitation Program provided much-needed relief.77 
Meskwaki men and women found jobs in these programs or at 
the OIA sanatorium in Toledo, but the demand for employment 
72. Ibid.; Toledo Chronicle, 5/9/1929; Nelson to John Collier, 2/23/1935, file “Let-
ters Sent 1934,” box 36, NARAGL. 
73. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 12.  
74. Westwood, “Memorandum for Mr. Collier,” IRA-MHPDM.  
75. Brown, “Social History,” 74.  
76. Jacob Breid, “1934 Annual Statistical Report,” 3, file “Annual Reports 051, 
1931–1935,” box 113, NARAGL. 
77. Harlan to H. D. Bernbrock, 4/30/1932, file 49C, part 8; and H. M. Rhode, 
memorandum 12/15/1930, file 49C, part 7, both in Harlan Papers, SHSI-DM. 
For general information on the CCC-ID, see Donald L. Parman, “The Indian and 
the Civilian Conservation Corps,” Pacific Historical Review 40 (1971), 39–56. For 
more on the IRRP and other Indian-oriented relief programs, see Virginia Davis, 
“A Discovery of Sorts: Reexamining the Origins of the Federal Indian Housing 
Obligation,” Harvard Blackletter Law Journal 18 (2002), 211–39. 
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stayed so high that officials had to rotate work schedules in order 
to spread wages as evenly as possible across the tribe.78 
 The 1920s and ‘30s were turbulent years on the Meskwaki 
settlement. Partisanship within the tribe was exacerbated by OIA 
efforts to divide the tribe against itself. The agency also success-
fully repelled repeated tribal efforts to reclaim the sovereignty it 
had wielded before 1896. With the nation reeling from the Great 
Depression, the Meskwaki would undertake an arduous initia-
tive to regain control over their collective governance—an effort 
that reshaped tribal politics.  
THE “INDIAN NEW DEAL” laid out the new approach to In-
dian policy taken by the administration of Franklin Delano Roo-
sevelt. It included a variety of provisions to improve conditions 
for American Indians nationwide, spearheaded by FDR’s Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier.79 He abandoned allot-
ment and instilled new respect for tribal customs, replacing old 
policies with the Indian Reorganization Act. This sweeping law 
sought to remedy the numerous Indian policy failures identified 
in the sharply critical 1928 Meriam Report.80 Despite the improve-
ments espoused by the Indian New Deal, continuities with ear-
lier policies existed, as Cathleen D. Cahill points out, “particularly 
the [OIA’s] tendency toward paternalism and essentialist think-
ing about Indigenous cultures.”81 But Collier’s efforts became, 
78. See boxes “CCC-ID Program Records,” and “Indian Relief and Rehabilita-
tion General Records,” both in NARAGL. These collections offer general insight 
into the various relief projects taking place on the settlement in the 1930s. See 
also Lykins, “Curing the Indian,” 147.  
79. Kenneth R. Philp, John Collier’s Crusade for Indian Reform, 1920–1954 (Tucson,
AZ, 1977), 113–34. See also Harry A. Kersey Jr., The Florida Seminoles and the New 
Deal, 1933–1942 (Boca Raton, FL, 1989).  
80. The “Meriam Report,” written by the Brookings Institution, Institute for
Government Research, is formally known as The Problem of Indian Administra-
tion: Report of a Survey Made at the Request of Honorable Hubert Work, Secretary of 
the Interior, and Submitted to Him, February 21, 1928 (Baltimore, 1928), and can be 
viewed at www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED087573.pdf, accessed 5/30/2012.  
81. Cathleen D. Cahill, Federal Fathers and Mothers: A Social History of the United
States Indian Service, 1869–1933 (Chapel Hill, NC, 2011), 257. For more on Collier 
and the IRA, see Philp, John Collier’s Crusade; Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. 
Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty 
(New York, 1984); Akim Reinhardt, “A Crude Replacement: The Indian New 
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at least for the Meskwaki, an opportunity to reestablish self-
governance and defend their sovereignty. 
 Originally called the Wheeler-Howard Act, the IRA under-
went an arduous period of legislative debate and amendment be-
ginning in February 1934. As Congress considered the bill, Collier 
and his aides held a series of ten meetings in Native communities 
across the nation, where they pitched the ideals of the IRA to var-
ious tribal delegations.82 Those congresses, as they were called, 
provided an opportunity for the OIA to take its newly reconsti-
tuted mission—to replace “administrative absolutism” with local, 
tribal self-governance—from the bureaucratic halls of Washing-
ton to the communities it influenced. Neither Native communities 
nor Congress received the Wheeler-Howard Act as well as Collier 
had hoped, and the effort nearly floundered. Nonetheless, the 
much-altered bill became law on June 18, 1934, despite the ob-
stacles presented by a highly polarized Congress. It ultimately 
offered a watered-down form of self-governance embodied in 
tribal constitutions that tribes could compose and ratify. Collier 
continued to claim that, despite the many changes made by Con-
gress, the IRA still provided an opportunity for Indians to regain 
much of the independence and authority they had lost during as-
similation. But their self-governance would continue to be couched 
under federal authority.83  
 Native tribes that chose reorganization took a series of steps. 
They first had to vote to accept the IRA and then draft a tribal 
Deal, Indirect Colonialism, and Pine Ridge Reservation,” Journal of Colonialism 
and Colonial History 6 (2005), 1–56; Graham D. Taylor, The New Deal and American 
Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934–1945 
(Lincoln, NE, 1980); Felix S. Cohen, On the Drafting of Tribal Constitutions, ed. 
David E. Wilkins (Norman, OK, 2007); Elmer R. Rusco, A Fateful Time: The Back-
ground and Legislative History of the Indian Reorganization Act (Reno, NV, 2000); 
Wilcomb E. Washburn, “A Fifty–Year Perspective on the Indian Reorganization 
Act,” American Anthropologist 86 (1984), 279–89; Jennifer McLerran, A New Deal 
for Native Art: Indian Arts and Federal Policy, 1933–1943 (Tucson, AZ, 2009). 
82. Deloria and Lytle, Nations Within, 80–153, provides an excellent discussion 
on the congressional debates over the Wheeler-Howard Act. For the meetings 
with Native communities, see Vine Deloria Jr., ed., The Indian Reorganization Act 
Congresses and Bills (Norman, OK, 2002).  
83. Haas, Ten Years of Tribal Government, 1; Deloria, Indian Reorganization Act, xv; 
Collier, “Facts about the New Indian Reorganization Act: An Explanation and 
Interpretation of the Wheeler-Howard Bill as Modified, Amended, and Passed 
by Congress,” 9–10, file 46U, part 43, group 4, Harlan Papers, SHSI-DM.  
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constitution under OIA guidance. Such assistance included a 
process of repeated revision and a clear agency effort to pressure 
tribes to integrate democratic governance into their constitutions. 
The IRA required the Secretary of the Interior to call a ratification 
election once tribes had a completed draft and, assuming tribal 
approval, the secretary had to formally approve the document 
for it to take effect.84  
 For the Meskwaki, this process began in April 1934 even as 
Congress debated the Wheeler-Howard Act and Collier and his 
OIA held its congresses across the country. At a meeting on April 
7, the tribe selected an eight-member committee to study, inter-
pret, and explain the IRA. Over the course of nearly 20 such 
meetings, this group went over the law, carefully weighing and 
explaining its merits to tribal members.85 Edgar R. Harlan, cura-
tor of the Historical, Memorial, and Art Department of Iowa 
(now known as the State Historical Society) in Des Moines, sent 
an inquiry to Collier in September 1934 on behalf of several Mes-
kwaki as to the full impact the legislation would have on the 
tribe. Harlan, a non-Native widely viewed by the Meskwaki as a 
friend and advocate, noted that many Meskwaki were unclear 
about the changes between the original Wheeler-Howard Bill 
and the final IRA. He therefore requested an explanation of pre-
cisely those sections that would directly affect the Meskwaki, 
given the settlement’s unique status as both communally owned 
and in a federal/tribal trust. Harlan noted that such an explana-
tion would clarify the IRA for the Meskwaki “so that each indi-
vidual, regardless of his factional attitude, may know exactly 
what he is in favor of, and what the law proposes, and what he is 
against.” Harlan further observed that most opposition stemmed 
from Meskwaki suspicions of IRA provisions that had nothing to 
do with their tribe; they tended to doubt new policies that ap-
peared “manifestly intended for a different tribe or culture.”86  
84. Deloria and Lytle, Nations Within, 141. Hass, Ten Years of Tribal Government, 3, 
notes that from 1934 to 1936, 181 tribes accepted the IRA while 77 rejected it. 
85. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” 15–17.  
86. Harlan to Collier, 9/25/1934, file 49U, part 43, group 4, Harlan Papers, SHSI-
DM. Harlan was a close friend of the tribe throughout his career as the curator 
at the precursor to the State Historical Society of Iowa. He worked directly with 
Jonas Poweshiek (a Meskwaki who lived in Des Moines and worked at the 
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 The tribe was well aware of the Indian Office’s steadfast sup-
port for the IRA. The agency strongly encouraged the new poli-
cies and showed little restraint in selling them to the Meskwaki. 
Collier asserted that there would be no retribution against tribes 
that did not accept reorganization, but he presented them with a 
harsh alternative, arguing that tribes that refused the IRA would 
“merely drift to the rear of the great advance open to the Indian 
race.” It is not implausible, therefore, that the Meskwaki felt 
threatened by Collier’s rhetoric, especially as he argued that non-
IRA tribes would “stand still and . . . continue to lose [their] 
lands.”87  
 A complex political situation developed around the IRA is-
sue, and lasted throughout the process.88 While many Meskwaki 
viewed reorganization as a new and effective tool for self-gov-
ernance, others wanted to reject it and return to the chief-council 
system.89 Still others rejected both proposed options, refused to 
participate in the process, or were undecided on the issue. 
 When the IRA became law in 1934, the tribe had already been 
working toward the restoration of its self-governance for over 
half a decade. Yet the form of that self-governance and, more im-
portantly, who would be at the helm, remained unclear. Some 
feared that reorganization would provide disproportionate po-
litical advantage to IRA supporters. For some tribal members, the 
old politics reemerged, complicating matters even further: the 
Youngbears, it was popularly assumed, supported the IRA, while 
many Oldbears opposed it.90 It is reasonable to assume that a 
third group also existed outside this rigid binary: tribal members 
who weighed their support for reorganization not because of 
any factional affiliation but because they were undecided as to 
historical society), was ceremonially adopted into the tribe in the early 1920s, 
and frequently acted as a liaison between the tribe and non-Indians. 
87. Collier, “Facts about the New IRA,” 16.
88. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 40–46, offers an excellent account 
of the Meskwaki encounter with the IRA elections and the constitution-making 
process.  
89. Edward Davenport, George Young Bear, Horace Poweshiek, and William
Poweshiek to John Collier, 6/29/1937; Young Bear, Charles Davenport, C. H. 
Chuck, Peter Morgan, John Tataposh, and Sam Slick to John Collier, 12/13/1937, 
both in IRA-MHPDM.  
90. Brown, “Social History,” 80; Foley, Heartland Chronicles, 151.
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whether the law posed effective solutions to the political prob-
lems their people faced. 
 An election in June 1935 offered the Meskwaki only two 
choices: accept or reject reorganization. Several Meskwaki op-
posed the IRA based on their recollections of the pre-1896 era. 
Jack Old Bear and four others wrote to Secretary of the Interior 
Harold Ickes in December 1934, arguing that, as owners of their 
land, the Meskwaki should not have to comply with the IRA. In-
stead, they argued, the tribe was “capable of self-government” 
without the law and was already attempting to seat a governing 
council. Fearing that reorganization would strip them of owner-
ship of the settlement, they asked to be exempted from the law.91 
Collier responded on Ickes’s behalf, assuming that the Meskwaki 
had misunderstood the act. He reassured them that the IRA 
would not disrupt their collective ownership and reaffirmed their 
right to hold an IRA election.92 
 Collier’s response did not satisfy the many tribal members 
who remained unsure of the effects the law would have on their 
community. As opposition grew, Collier asked the agency super-
intendent, Ira D. Nelson, to gauge Meskwaki inclinations toward 
the bill and to uncover the causes of Meskwaki discontent. Nel-
son responded, noting that, based on his observations at a tribal 
meeting, only a few Meskwaki opposed the law. By May 1935, 
the Meskwaki had organized a number of meetings at which the 
IRA’s provisions were explained and discussed in detail, and 
Nelson reported that he had made every effort to thoroughly ex-
plain them. He admitted, however, to feeling that certain tribal 
members would be “much better satisfied” by a visit from an-
other OIA official prior to the election. The agency accordingly 
sent two representatives to Tama to discuss the IRA just before 
the election. They were likely tasked with promoting the law to 
tribal members.93  
 Their efforts paid off. During the election of June 15, 38 per-
cent of eligible Meskwaki turned out to vote. They accepted the 
91. Jack Old Bear, Joe Peters, Harrison Kapayou, and John Tataposh to Ickes,
12/18/1934, IRA-MHPDM. 
92. Collier to Old Bear, 1/21/1935, IRA-MHPDM.
93. Ibid.; Nelson to Collier, 5/18/1935, IRA-MHPDM; Collier to Nelson, 5/24/ 
1935 and 6/11/1935, IRA-MHPDM. 
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IRA by a wide margin of 63 to 13.94 The election was notable for 
two main reasons. First, and most obviously, the Meskwaki ac-
cepted the law, moving their tribe into the second phase of reor-
ganization. Second, although the wide margin of victory seemed 
to show overwhelming support for the IRA, the reality was far 
more complicated: The amount of Meskwaki “opposition was 
much greater than the number of ‘no’ votes would indicate,” 
because some 62 percent of tribal members, who were either un-
decided on the issue or opposed reorganization outright, inten-
tionally abstained from voting.95  
 The opposition had attempted to nullify the IRA election 
through boycott. Convention incorrectly holds that the abstainers 
did not understand democratic elections or thought they were 
following tribal custom and believed that by not showing up, 
they would be counted as voting against the IRA. Also, it has 
been argued, the low voter turnout may have been due to an in-
ability of many tribal members to travel to the ballot place. Both 
of these arguments fail to recognize that many Meskwaki had 
been participating in democratic elections for over a decade and 
that agency reports describe the settlement as “small and [there-
fore] easy for the voters to get together,” especially in the good 
weather offered by a June election.96 Thus, some tribal members 
may have opposed the IRA due to their political affiliations, oth-
ers because they suspected that the IRA would negatively affect 
their community or land ownership. Still others could have had 
any number of reasons not to support the law. But none of these 
rationales should be equated with a widespread misunderstand-
ing of an electoral process in which tribal members had been par-
ticipating for years.  
 A more likely explanation lies in the possibility that the oppo-
sition misinterpreted Section 17 of the IRA, leading them to devel-
op a strategy that would use a loophole to stymie the legislation. 
Nelson noted in a spring 1936 letter to Collier that those opposing 
the IRA “claim[ed] that it is necessary for at least thirty percent 
94. Nelson to Collier, 6/15/1935, IRA-MHPDM.  
95. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 43. See also Buffalo, “Historical 
Overview,” 17–18. 
96. Benjamin Reifel to Collier, 3/5/1937, IRA-MHPDM. 
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of the adult Indians of the reservation to sign a petition requesting 
and authorizing the adoption of the proposed constitution and 
bylaws.”97 Although this letter came several months after the 
1935 election, it suggests that some anti-IRA Meskwaki thought 
that by abstaining from the election the previous June, they could 
keep the electoral turnout below 30 percent. Doing so, they mis-
takenly believed, would nullify the IRA. Their interpretation of 
the law was inaccurate because, although the 30 percent provi-
sion did exist, it only applied to tribal corporate charters, not to 
elections for the IRA or for constitutional ratification.98 The ab-
stentions, then, reveal another calculated—if ultimately unsuc-
cessful—effort by some Meskwaki to prevent reorganization and 
maintain their customary system of governance. 
 The OIA and Meskwaki supporters of reorganization disre-
garded their opponents as legally naïve and quickly set about 
drafting the Meskwaki constitution following their 1935 victory. 
Several eager Meskwaki had elected a constitutional committee 
in 1934, before the IRA had even become law. That group, which 
included George Young Bear, Edward Davenport, and brothers 
Horace and William Poweshiek, worked in close conjunction 
with the agency for some 18 months to craft the document. They 
requested and amassed copies of constitutions from other tribes 
and used them as guides while OIA agents critiqued the docu-
ment’s form and language. The OIA did leave the majority of the 
legal decision making to the tribe. The committee proceeded very 
slowly through each stage of the process, wary of making mis-
takes or drafting language the tribe might not accept. OIA field 
agent Benjamin Reifel, observing this caution, called the commit-
tee “one of the most exacting that I have ever worked with.” An-
other administrator called them “extraordinarily painstaking in 
their deliberations.”99 
97. Nelson to Collier, 3/19/1936, IRA-MHPDM.
98. F. H. Daiker to Nelson, 5/18/1936, IRA-MHPDM. See also Indian Reorgani-
zation Act, sec. 17. 
99. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 40–41; Cedar Rapids Gazette, 5/17/ 
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 As it became increasingly clear that the tribe was on the verge 
of a new system of self-governance, several issues arose regarding 
the constitution’s form and content. Perhaps the most contentious 
disagreement among tribal members focused on the redistribution 
of settlement land. Although the tribe’s communal use system had 
sufficed in the settlement’s earliest years, by the early twentieth 
century, it created “wide variances in land distribution [where] a 
few families had as much as 60 acres while others had only enough 
for a homestead and garden.”100 Some Meskwaki supported 
allowing the council to reassign lands under the constitution in 
order to share the settlement more equally. That proposal met 
resistance from those claiming larger tracts of land, as they often 
rented or share-cropped their plots to other tribal members, mak-
ing land an especially important Depression-era issue.101  
100. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 30, 43; Grant, “The Indian.” 
101. Westwood, “Memorandum for Mr. Collier.” 
 
The Meskwaki Constitutional Committee—(from left) George Young Bear 
Sr., William Poweshiek, Horace Poweshiek, and Ed Davenport—spent over 
three years drafting and revising the document that still governs their tribe 
today. Photo (ca. 1937) from the Meskwaki Historic Preservation Depart-
ment and Museum, Meskwaki Settlement.  
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 Land remained at the center of Meskwaki politics, but whereas 
it had previously been a unifying buffer between the tribe and ex-
ternal forces, by the 1930s it was also a point of internal discord. 
The committee searched for a politically balanced land reform 
process that would ameliorate the issue without alienating 
enough Meskwaki to endanger the constitution. Its final version 
recognized extant land assignments but empowered the tribal 
council to reassign settlement lands under certain circumstances. 
Despite this compromise, the provision continued to fuel op-
position to the constitution and would, in part, nearly stymie its 
ratification.102 
 Tribal citizenship was another major issue, and it, too, focused 
on concerns over land and tribal resources. Although the tribe 
remained composed almost entirely of full-blooded Meskwaki, 
by the mid-1930s some had married or had children with mem-
bers of other tribes.103 Meskwaki Sam Slick argued to Superin-
tendent Nelson that tribal “children should be enrolled with the 
father,” as was customary. If the tribe adopted “just anyone,” 
Slick argued, there would develop “such a mix-up” that people 
would cease to regard “real” Meskwaki. As Indians repeatedly 
intermarried with members of other tribes, he complained, they 
occupied Meskwaki land via the inheritance system.104 Again at-
tempting to placate those on both sides of this hotly contested 
issue, the final constitution continued the patriarchal adoption 
102. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 43–46; D’Arcy McNickle, “Mem-
orandum to Mr. Harper, Re: Sac and Fox Indians, Tama, Iowa,” 12/30/1936, 
IRA-MHPDM; Westwood, “Memorandum to Mr. Collier.” See also Meskwaki 
Constitution, art. X, sec. 1 and art. XI.  
103. Westwood, “Memorandum for Mr. Collier,” notes that virtually no inter-
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married members of other Native tribes, “particularly [the] Winnebago and 
Potawatomi.” 
104. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 43–46. This issue also arose in 
1931 when “the question came up as to who should be enrolled” following tribal 
intermarriages. To solve the issue, the “Indian Office told the [Meskwaki] to get 
together and decide for themselves; the decision was that the children should 
follow the Father—a mother marrying outside the tribe lost her rights.” See 
“Minutes, January 8, 1935,” folder “749 Community Meetings—Minutes of 
Meetings and Related Correspondence”; and “Memo Re. Sac and Fox Indians 
of Iowa: Washington, Feb. 4, 1931,” in folder “771 Charities and Benevolences—
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293, NARAGL. See also Meskwaki Constitution, art. II.  
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system preferred by Slick but also allowed the tribal council to for-
mally adopt children of mixed Meskwaki lineage in some cases. 
 The committee struggled throughout 1937 to gain support 
for the document. They had attempted to craft a constitution that 
was both effective and politically palatable. The constitution re-
duced the minimum age for a seat on the tribal council to 25 and 
opened it to females. Some tribal members viewed both of these 
changes as controversial deviations from established custom. 
(Although women had long played an integral role in tribal pol-
itics, they had not previously been allowed to hold a seat on the 
council.) Additionally, under reorganization, many duties that 
had once been left to the chief’s council, “such as representing 
the tribe in negotiations with the government and resolving dis-
putes among its members,” would be transferred to the new, 
elected council.105  
 Contention also arose because some tribal members remained 
unsure of the IRA’s potential consequences. The committee had 
numerous meetings throughout 1937 with agency representatives 
as drafts of the document made the rounds through the OIA. Fed-
eral officials offered various, although generally slight, changes. 
Many Meskwaki remained unclear about the constitution’s pro-
visions. In February one asked Charlotte Westwood, a federal of-
ficial close to the committee, “for a statement of what a constitu-
tion is and the purposes of the proposed tribal constitution.” 
Westwood took the request seriously because she felt that some 
tribal members did “not understand the purpose or meaning of 
[re]organization.”106 Although some Meskwaki might have been 
unclear as to some nuanced legal language encapsulated in the 
document, virtually all saw that it would shift tribal governance 
and power dynamics. By November 1937, the fate of the pending 
constitution was far from assured. But the time had arrived for 
the ratification election.  
 Four years of political turmoil surrounded the IRA, leading 
to a dramatic election late in 1937. The constitution had received 
its final OIA approval in early autumn, after which the agency 
set the election date and forwarded 200 copies to tribal members 
105. Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 45; Meskwaki Constitution, art. 
IV and art. X, sec. 3–4.  
106. Westwood to Zimmerman, 2/20/1937, IRA-MHPDM. 
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for final clarification of its provisions and implications. With the 
sovereign decision to restructure their government and build a 
new political future for their community before them, tribal 
members cast their ballots. On November 13, with more than 
double the previous election’s turnout, the tribe ratified the doc-
ument by an excruciatingly narrow vote of 80 to 78. Assistant 
Secretary of the Interior Oscar L. Chapman approved it five weeks 
later, officially restructuring the Meskwaki government under 
the Indian Reorganization Act.107 
THE MESKWAKI NATION continues to be governed under 
the 1937 constitution. It established an elected council of seven 
tribal members who carry legal authority over matters of tribal 
membership, taxation, education, healthcare, land assignments, 
and relations between the state and federal governments.108 But 
the constitution has never existed without controversy. Its oppo-
nents immediately attempted to overturn its ratification. John Ta-
taposh, for example, wrote to President Roosevelt, arguing that 
because the settlement was “communally owned by the [tribe], 
[and] purchased with their ancestors’ own money,” every tribal 
member had “a right of ownership of the land . . . to the disposal 
of our affairs as he sees fit.” The IRA and its constitution, he as-
serted, should not be applicable on the settlement, and tribal gov-
ernance should occur exclusively on Meskwaki terms.109 To make 
his case, Tataposh drew on his tribe’s history. Because of the set-
tlement’s anomalous status in the decades before 1896, the Mes-
kwaki had experienced an unparalleled level of political autonomy 
during an era of land dispossession and sovereign suppression. 
The tribe’s involvement with the OIA after that time, leading up 
to the battles over reorganization in the 1930s, mirrored that of 
Native nations across the country, with some key distinctions 
based on its unique land ownership. Meskwaki tribal members 
struggled throughout to maintain their sovereignty as the 
107. Zimmerman to Nelson, 9/22/1937, IRA-MHPDM; Nelson to Collier, 9/30/ 
1937, IRA-MHPDM; Daubenmier, Meskwaki and Anthropologists, 45; Buffalo, 
“Historical Overview,” 25. 
108. Brown, “Social History,” 81.  
109. John Tataposh to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 2/2/1938, IRA-MHPDM. 
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pressures of OIA interference and internal partisanship tore at 
their political fabric. 
 In the twenty-first century, members of the Meskwaki Nation 
continue to draw on this history. The settlement boundary, as in 
many indigenous communities, still marks an autonomous Mes-
kwaki space that “reinforce[s] tribal cultures and identities.”110 
Daily life requires tribal members to transcend those boundaries, 
and they continue to assert their sovereignty by working across 
the American political system. The Meskwaki Nation uses assets 
like gaming revenues to bolster education and healthcare and to 
purchase additional land. Yet in some ways, generations-old 
political disagreements remain. The tribe has attempted to repeal 
or dramatically reform its constitution approximately once per 
decade over the past 75 years, most recently in 2004.111 Moreover, 
not long ago a Meskwaki tribal judge referred to the constitution 
as “flawed and biased from the start” because, in her view, the 
federal government had forced the IRA onto her community.112 
Some might see her statement, or the highly publicized turbulence 
surrounding the 2003 Meskwaki Casino shutdown as reminis-
cent of the discordant politics of the early twentieth century.113 
 As the longer arc of Meskwaki history reveals, however, the 
conversation between tribal members and surrounding govern-
ments—as well as among themselves—over the meaning and 
form of Meskwaki sovereignty has been ongoing since at least 
the mid–nineteenth century. Because of the tribe’s ownership of 
the settlement, the Meskwaki story is in many ways unique. But 
its core characteristics are not. The Indian policies of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries are too often remembered as 
being overwhelming for American Indian tribes. Such histories 
cast Native peoples as unable to defend themselves, their re-
sources, or their rights against the pressures of assimilation and 
110. Rand, “Primary Sources,” 136–37. 
111. Buffalo, “Historical Overview,” i, 29–47, details the seven major attempts 
(1938, 1948, 1962, 1978, 1986, 1994, and 2004) to reform the tribal constitution. 
112. Theresa Essman Mahoney, “Practical Tips for Advocates of Indian Children: 
A Tribal Perspective” (slideshow presented at the 2011 Iowa State Bar Associa-
tion’s Juvenile Law Seminar, 5/6/2011), 3–4.  
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2003, www.indianz.com/News/archives/001047.asp, accessed 7/13/2012.  
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allotment. Looking to the Meskwaki Nation reminds us that 
while American Indians were indeed affected by the oppressive 
policies of the time, tribal members used their resources, both 
physical and political, to understand and engage the changing 
political world around them. Even in moments of weakness 
relative to the OIA, the Meskwaki people remained active and 
searched for strategies to regain local control. They acted oppor-
tunistically to defend their right to self-governance, because their 
interest rarely, if ever, strayed far from protecting and affirming 
their tribal sovereignty. 
